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Trade Unions and the Third Round of Political 
Fund Review Balloting 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Trade Union Act 1984 required trade unions to reballot their members on 
continuation of their political funds. In the 1980s, and again in the 1990s, all 
unions voted for retention. A third round of balloting has now taken place. 
This article reports a further round of success, analyses the outcomes, and 
compares them with the two previous rounds. The results are considered in 
the light of the changing relationship between unions and the Labour Party 
as part of the ongoing ‘contentious alliance’.  A distinction is drawn between 
the right to campaign politically and direct links to the Labour Party.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
From 1913 until 1984 British trade unions wishing to use their resources for 
political purposes have been required by legislation to ballot their members 
to establish political objects as part of their rules and to maintain separate 
political funds in order to do this (Trade Union Act 1913). Only unions with 
political funds could use these to support political parties. In 1984 the 
legislation was extended, by the then Conservative government, to require 
decadal review ballots on maintaining these funds. It was argued by the 
government in support of this change that the members who had established 
political funds in 1913 were now dead and that evidence of voting trends in 
recent general elections suggested that support among union members for 
the Labour Party was weaker than in 1913 and therefore this relationship 
needed to be tested periodically.  
 
Secondly in 1984, the definition of political activity covered by the legislation 
was extended to include: ‘the production, publication or distribution of any 
literature, document, film, sound recording or advertisement the main 
purpose of which is to persuade people to vote for a political party or 
candidate or to persuade them not to vote for a party or candidate’ (Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (s.72(1) (f)). This 
potentially restricted the ability of unions without political funds to campaign 
on issues affecting them which were the result of government policy. A test 
of this new law came during the 1987 general election period when NALGO 
ran a ‘Make People Matter’ campaign which was judged to contravene the 
1984 Act because the material in effect urged members to vote against the 
Conservatives even if it did not categorically urge a vote for Labour. The 
message from the Paul and Fraser v NALGO (1987) case was that unions 
wishing to campaign politically, even if they did not wish to affiliate to the 
Labour Party, needed to have a political fund.  
 
The 1984 legislation had a clear outcome and two consequences. The 
outcome was a series of resounding votes for continuing political funds in all 
38 review ballots with 84% of members who voted, voting YES (Blackwell 
and Terry, 1987; Leopold, 1986; Steele at al., 1986). The first consequence 
was that over twenty unions, previously without political funds and not 
affiliated to the Labour Party, voted to establish political funds as an 
‘insurance policy’ protecting their ability to campaign (Leopold, 1988). The 
second consequence was that even unions which had previously used their 
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political funds largely for affiliation to the Labour Party now had to consider 
whether some expenditure on wider political campaigning, which had 
previously been charged to general funds, should now be attributed to the 
political fund as the new definition potentially affected the legality of such 
expenditure.  
The second round of mandatory review balloting took place over the 1994-6 
period, again resulting in high Yes votes, averaging 82% of those members 
voting (Leopold, 1997). Leopold(ibid:36) concluded that ‘the successful 
retention of political funds in 1994/6 was based on a campaign that 
emphasized unions’ rights to campaign politically rather than on their specific 
links to the Labour Party’.  Since the 1996 ballots the income to political 
funds has been around £16 million annually with 4.2 million union members 
contributing in 2003 (Certification Office, 1996-2005). Expenditure has 
varied between £12.5 and £20.5 million, but has peaked in the general 
election years of 1997 and 2001 (and is likely to show a further peak in 2005 
when those figures become available); so the outcome of review ballots and 
the use of the funds remain of considerable significance.  2003-05 has seen 
the third round of review balloting under the legislation. Drawing upon 
material produced by each re-balloting union, the Trade Union Co-ordinating 
Committee (TUCC), interviews with campaign leaders, and follow up 
exchanges of emails, it is the purpose of this paper to report these results, 
analyse the outcomes, and compare them with the two previous rounds of 
balloting. But a first step is to outline and explain the changed context of 
voting under a Labour, rather than a Conservative, government.  
 
CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNIONS AND THE LABOUR 
PARTY 
The most important point of contrast between this current round of political 
fund review balloting and the previous two was that it was conducted under 
a Labour Government. It was no longer sufficient to call for a vote in favour 
of continued political funds as a vote against unwelcome Tory legislation, or 
a vote to enable a Labour government to act in favour of union interests. A 
Labour government had been in office for six years but the verdict on the 
benefits for unions was mixed. Since 1997 unions could be seen to have 
benefited from Labour’s willingness to sign up to the Maastricht treaty, the 
statutory recognition procedure in the Employment Relations Act 1999, 
‘family friendly’ measures in the same and subsequent legislation, and the 
Working Time Directive. On the other hand, ‘New Labour’ remained 
committed to maintaining legal restrictions on the right to strike, to privatise 
public services, to pursue labour market flexibility-even if this meant 
delaying or weakening EU Directives which it was meant to be supporting-
and reducing union influence within the Party (Heery et al., 2003; Labour 
Research, 2001).     
 
The relationship between the trade unions and the Labour Party has been 
characterised as ‘the contentious alliance’ (Minkin, 1992). There were, 
according to Minkin, eight factors that bound the two parties together; four 
operating in each direction, but number one was finance. The overall 
relationship has been categorised as a ‘union-party bonding model’ in which 
the special status of unions results in important and guaranteed 
governmental positions within the party’s organisational structure, but not in 
the domination of party policy making. (Ludlam and Taylor, 2003: 728). The 
issue of current concern is whether under two terms of ‘New Labour’ in office 
these links are becoming weaker, leading to an ‘internal lobbying model’ in 
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which formal organisational integration would be minimised, but where 
unions would still bring special expertise into party policy making.  
 
Ludlam and Taylor’s analysis of the ten years since Minkin’s study was 
published concluded that four of his original eight factors remained 
significant. Indeed: ‘the party had become more dependent on union finance 
and especially on union organizational resources for fighting elections, and 
had turned again to the affiliated unions to help secure the leadership’s 
objectives in the face of dissidence inside the party’ (Ludlam and Taylor, 
2003:745/6). However, each of the factors has, they argue, weakened since 
the start of the government’s second term in office.  If these changes 
continue then the nature of the relationship could change from being a ‘union 
party bonding model’ to an internal lobbying type. In such a scenario political 
fund money could be spent on wider channels of representation and 
campaigning.  
None of this is meant to imply a shift from ‘welfare’ to ‘business’ unionism. 
Business unionism in its American form did include political action where this 
was deemed necessary to pursue issues of direct relevance to AFL members 
(Jackson, 1991; Katz and Kochan 1992). At the same time while pursuing a 
policy of a division of labour between the role of the Labour Party and that of 
trade unions, British unions have also pursued business unionism practices. 
(Hyman,1989; Towers, 1997).  The internal lobbying model may be 
consistent with the political dimension built into business unionism, but the 
debates about the use of political fund monies and the nature of the link with 
the Labour Party are about the best way to pursue political goals rather than 
retreating from these altogether.  
We need to interpret the review ballot results and the evidence about what 
unions are actually doing with their money in the light of these two models of 
the relationship. However, Ludlam and Taylor’s (2003) conclusion, before the 
review ballots, was to urge a note of caution about any imminent shift to the 
internal lobbying model as ‘after a century’s investment in the Labour Party, 
British unions remain reluctant to radically reorder the political 
representation of the labour interest’ (p.747). 
 
Alternative sources of funding the Labour Party 
With fewer union members in the electorate some politicians have seen close 
ties to unions as counterproductive to electoral strategies aimed at winning 
middle class votes. Therefore, from such a perspective, a loosening of the 
links between Labour and the unions may be seen as desirable.  But such a 
strategy would necessitate alternative sources of funding for political parties. 
Alternatives which could be pursued are individual members, private 
donations, and the state. The proportion of Labour Party funding from trade 
unions declined from 66% in 1992 to 40% by 1997 and then to 33 % in 
2001 (Guardian Unlimited August 2001), so at first sight these alternatives 
seemed to be working, but each was to prove problematic. 
 
Leading ‘New Labour’ advisers advocated turning Labour into a mass party of 
individual membership rather than one of union block votes (Gould, 1998; 
Mandelson and Liddle, 1996). Building a mass party of individual members 
may have been something ‘New Labour’ leaders desired, but this was 
unlikely to sustain the levels of funding required to run a political party and, 
more importantly, provide the staff and finance to run general election 
campaigns in the 21st century. In the Blair leadership era Labour’s individual 
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membership peaked at c400,000 in 1997 and fell steady after the 1997 
election success to 280,000 in 2002, and 208,000 by 2004 (Wintour and 
Hall, 2004). Moreover not all of these members were activists (Seyd and 
Whitley, 2002) and so Labour still relied heavily on the ability of unions to 
deliver campaigning resources, of money and personnel, in its key target 
seats, winning 92 out of 93 in 1997 and again contributing significantly to re-
election in 2001 (Ludlam, 2002; Ludlam et al., 2002b).  
 
Paradoxically, the attempt by the Labour leadership to reduce dependence on 
union funding, and consequently the accusation that unions were buying 
favours, led to even greater controversy about the influence private 
individual donors may be buying.  The issue came to the fore following a 
number of highly controversial, large donations to the Labour Party from 
prominent business people such as Bernie Ecclestone, Lackshmi Mittal and 
Richard Desmond.  Following the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums 
Act 2000, a list of all donations to political parties above £200 have now to 
be submitted to an Electoral Commission, and published quarterly. All 
national donations over £5000 must have the source declared. Faced with 
adverse publicity, and combined with the later requirement to publicly 
declare larger donations, the supply of large individual and corporate 
donations dwindled, so that Labour continued to be dependent on union 
funding. But the disenchantment with Labour in government, combined with 
attacks from the left in unions meant that the total amount of money made 
available was reduced. 
 
Groups to the left of the Labour leadership were not the only advocates of 
weakening or breaking the links between unions and the Party. In 2002 Tony 
Blair himself initiated a debate on the state funding of political parties and a 
leading ‘New Labour’ think tank, The Institute for Public Policy Research, 
advocated state funding of political parties and of limiting the size of 
donation any organisation could make to a political party to £5000 (Cain and 
Taylor, 2002). The issue of a cap on individual donations became one for 
public policy debate in 2002. The prominent journalist and academic, Robert 
Taylor, advocated a divorce between unions and Labour so that unions could 
campaign independently rather than ‘pouring millions of pounds into the 
coffers of an ungrateful party’ (Taylor, 1998).  A counter view came in a 
pamphlet from the think tank, Catalyst, in which Keith Ewing argued that the 
relationship between trade unions and the Labour Party strengthens the 
party system as a whole, and urged further reform of the rules governing 
individual political donations. He argued against any statutory cap on political 
donations and advocated that political parties could receive up to a third of 
their income from the state but be tightly tied to their electoral performance 
and individual membership and only for specific purposes (Ewing, 2002).  
 
So within parts of the Labour Party, and encouraged by some outside 
political commentators, there were moves to lessen dependence on trade 
union funding and any potentially damaging inference that this relationship 
led to special favours.  Each alternative source of funding also proved 
problematic and so no clear path was followed.  
 
Union fortunes under Labour  
If union leaders were able to demonstrate clear and tangible benefits from a 
Labour government and from direct links related to the funding model, then 
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persuading union members to vote for a continuation of political funds on 
this basis would be easy.  Waddington (2003 p.335) has stressed that in the 
first term of the Labour government relationships were relatively placid, but 
into the second term expectations were raised. In this section we  review 
initial judgements of the relationship between the ‘New Labour’ government 
and unions in the first two terms of office and then consider more particularly 
the two years leading up to the review ballots which were characterised by 
growing tensions between unions and the Labour government. These were 
manifest in two main ways - in the election of a number of left wing general 
secretaries, dubbed by the press as the ‘awkward squad’, and of serious 
questions being asked in a number of unions about the level of support given 
to Labour and indeed, in some unions, whether there should continue to be 
affiliation or not.  
Prior to the 1997 general election the watchword from the TUC about the 
relationship between the unions and the Labour party was ‘fairness not 
favours’. In an initial assessment of the relationship between the TUC and 
the New Labour government, McIlroy(2000) judged that the TUC had 
restored its insider status, that is, an organisation accepted as legitimate by 
government and regularly consulted over policy. But this consultation did not 
necessarily result in desired policy outcomes. For example, while a statutory 
recognition procedure was achieved, it was not the procedure preferred by 
the TUC and no success was achieved on social partnership, or on stemming 
the tide of privatisation (McIlroy, 2000:12). In pursuing what Undy (2001: 
641) calls its procedural interest, the TUC failed to achieve a tripartite model 
of social partnership, partly because the government was anxious to avoid 
too close an association with trade unions lest it cause electoral 
disadvantage. So while the TUC was more of an insider than under the 
Conservative government, ‘New Labour took decisions unilaterally, not in 
negotiation with the TUC’ (Undy, 2001:646). 
 
In terms of the unions’ substantive interests Undy concludes that these were 
only partly satisfied in the first term, but points out that this was nothing 
new (Undy, 2001:653). He did, however, detect a widening ideological gap 
between the individualism of ‘New Labour’ and the collectivism of the TUC, 
even if the vagueness of ‘partnership’ could partially disguise this growing 
rift. He concluded that unions could therefore adopt a more instrumental 
view of their relationship with Labour seeking value for money in return for 
their continued financial support (Undy, 2001:653). Howell (2004) returns to 
the tension between collectivism and individualism and demonstrates that, 
for ‘New Labour’, regulation of the labour market is about individual rights at 
work rather than re-enforcing collective rights. And this takes place in an 
institutional framework that preserves most of the Conservative industrial 
relations legislation. The very ambiguity and inchoateness of ‘partnership’ is 
used to capture, on the one hand, a sense of togetherness between 
employers and employees and, on the other, to reject notions of ‘them and 
us’ associated with both ‘Old Labour’ and Thatcherism.  Smith and Morton 
(2001) put it more strongly in claiming that ‘New Labour’s’ goal of social 
partnership requires ‘the marginalisation of trade unionism as an 
autonomous force’ and that this is to be achieved by a combination of 
continued legislation to regulate unions and ‘the imposition of new rules for 
the hire and management of labour’ (p.120); unions are only legitimate if 
they are subordinate partners to capital.  
 
Reduced funding and new general secretaries  
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In the election year of 2001, unions donated just over £6m, or 55%, of 
Labour’s election spending, but this still left the Labour Party reportedly £8 
million in debt. In 2002 it had to appeal to the unions for an immediate 
£100,000 contribution to cover routine bills. 2002 saw a number of unions 
reduce their level of funding or threaten to link funding to support for specific 
policies (Waddington, 2003:355). For example, the RMT cut its affiliation fees 
by £100,000 and ended direct funding of the constituency parties of its 
parliamentary groups to instead spend the money (£43,000) on direct 
campaigning for rail re-nationalisation. In BECTU, the Party subscription now 
represents less than half of that fund’s expenditure following a cut back in its 
contribution in 2003. In 2004 the GMB withheld some £750,000 from a 
proposed £5 million special election fund in protest at pro-business policies. 
The money saved is to be used to fund the union’s campaign against 
creeping privatisation of the NHS.  
During 2002 a number of new general secretaries were elected, who were 
clearly anti-‘New Labour’. Indeed, in the case of Amicus and PCS, candidates 
who were seen by the members as being too close to ‘New Labour’ were 
voted out of office. Although the Socialist Alliance held a conference in March 
2002 entitled ‘The Political Fund- Where Should It Go?’ which urged a 
‘democratisation’ of the fund to enable union branches to say how it is spent, 
there were not many open calls for disaffiliation (Labour Research, 2002). 
Rather there were calls to ‘transform the union-party link so that the unions 
are respected as the representatives of more than 8 million members and 
their families, and their views are sought out’ (Gilchrist, 2002). Some 
eighteen months later Andy Gilchrist was to lead the FBU to disaffiliation, but 
as early as 2002 he warned that unions were likely to spend a greater 
proportion of their funds on campaigning for pro-union, pro-worker policies 
and consequently provide less direct funding to the Party.  
 
Unions were still spending their political fund money but increasingly a larger 
proportion of it went on political campaigns rather than directly on the 
Labour Party.  And often these campaigns were directed against some aspect 
of government policy.  In particular, unions were opposed to any public 
sector reform that could be construed as privatisation in some disguise or 
another. It is no surprise that the unions most disaffected with ‘New Labour’ 
in office are those whose members work largely in the public sector or in 
heavily state regulated employment such as the rail unions (ASLEF, RMT), 
post and telecoms (CWU) and the fire service (FBU).  Strikes or the threat of 
strikes in various parts of the public sector in 2002 created further tensions 
between the relevant unions and the government. The conference season in 
2003 saw RMT, GMB, CWU, and Unison all reduce party funding. But in 2003 
the main issue of confrontation was whether unions would support Ken 
Livingstone as candidate for the mayor of London or back the official Labour 
candidate. ASLEF and RMT both voted to back Livingstone, but the matter 
did not come to a head, as Livingstone was re-admitted to the Party and 
became the official candidate.  
 
The debates about the links with the Labour Party at union conferences in 
2003 gave rise to some concern with the political fund review ballots 
looming.  Political commentators debated the issue in the quality press, 
offering alternative  policies for those who would listen.  George Monbiot 
argued in a feature in The Guardian that ‘the party they (trade unions) had 
created has disowned them, so they must disinherit it’ (Monbiot, 2002).  
Alternatively, Seumas Milne, that paper’s labour editor, urged that ‘the way 
to save Labour from fragmentation is neither to encourage disaffiliation nor 
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to stand on the sidelines and moan about New Labour, but to use continued 
union power and influence in the Labour Party to advocate new policies’ 
(Milne, 2003).   
For those active in the Trade Union Group of Labour MPs, the demands for 
disaffiliation, or ‘freeing’ of political funds, was attributed to ‘a small band of 
activists involved in far left politics’ (Eagle, 2003 :6). While clearly opposed 
to their objective of creating a new ‘mass workers party’, Eagle and others 
were concerned that the receptiveness of union activists to such demands 
reflected frustration and disillusionment at Labour’s performance in 
government. But rather than this leading to a call for fragmentation of 
political links, Eagle urged a strengthening. 
 
Advocates of both positions were found in unions. In some unions, the 
degrees of dissatisfaction lead to consideration of supporting other political 
parties and/or disaffiliation from Labour. The RMT conference voted to allow 
branches to affiliate to parties other than Labour. This decision was 
confirmed at a special general meeting in February 2004 and five of its 
Scottish branches confirmed their decision to support the Scottish Socialist 
Party. Subsequently the union was expelled from the Labour Party. The FBU 
voted to disaffiliate in 2004, having previously begun to unpick the 
relationship with Labour in 2000 by voting at its conference to permit 
members to specify that their contribution should not go to Labour.  
 
However these two unions, and the success of activists within them 
unpicking the links with Labour, turned out to be isolated examples. In other 
unions the leadership came under some pressure to review the links, but 
successfully campaigned to persuade a majority of members to maintain 
them. For example, the BECTU Executive had been instructed by a 
conference vote, against its recommendation, to research alternative forms 
of Parliamentary representation, but having done so recommended continued 
affiliation. 73% of members participating, voted for continued affiliation on a 
turnout of just over 30% in November 2003; figures which were closely 
paralleled a year later in the review ballot. The executive of Unison was also 
compelled by their 2001 conference to conduct a review of how its two 
political funds were used, but successfully recommended to the 2003 
conference that the union should continue to have an affiliated fund and a 
non-affiliated one. Similar reaffirmations of the link took place in ASLEF, 
TSSA, and the CWU (Labour Research, 2003). 
 
Charlwood’s assessment of the new generation of union leaders was that 
they could not universally be categorised as an ‘awkward squad’ but that 
most of them ‘remained committed to the links between unions and the 
Labour Party’ (Charlwood, 2004: 391).  They then set out to ‘reclaim’ the 
party by making demands on it, and the big four unions co-operated to 
pursue their demands at the Labour conference. Moreover they combined to 
reassert their role at conference by altering the procedures to increase the 
number of issues that could be debated at future conferences.  
 
In May 2004 a conference entitled ‘Working together for a Radical third term’ 
was convened by the ‘big four’ unions, Amicus, GMB, TGWU and Unison and 
was evidence of a regrouping to re-assert the link but demand something in 
return for it. This was followed two months later by a meeting of the Policy 
Forum at Warwick University which moved towards agreement on a 
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manifesto that unions and Labour could agree. This forum could be seen as 
an attempt to rebuild and re-establish the relationship between the Labour 
Party and unions rather than continue on a path of distrust and disaffiliation 
(Labour Research, 2005).    
 
THE RESULTS OF THE 2003-04 CAMPAIGN 
 
Given this background it is no surprise that there was some apprehension in 
the trade union movement about how unions would fare in the third round of 
political fund review balloting. The results of the current campaign are 
presented in table 1. 
Insert table 1 here  
From this we can see that in this third round of balloting there was again a 
clear Yes vote, but the average Yes vote at 78% is slightly lower than in the 
previous two rounds. It was similar to the average of 76% achieved by the 
seven unions which re-balloted between 1997 and 2000. However, the 
turnout in this third round at 28%, is much lower than the 38% achieved in 
1994-6. Differences in the Yes vote between this round and the 1994-96 
round for individual unions can be seen more sharply in table 2. 
 
Insert table 2 here  
 
The range of Yes votes was 51-96 per cent (67-96% discounting the 
Prospect new fund vote) which was similar to the 65-93% Yes vote achieved 
in the 1990s and 54-93% Yes vote in the eighties. However, from table 2 we 
can see that more unions had a sizeable decline in the percentage voting Yes 
than those with a rise. In nearly half of the unions balloting the decline in the 
Yes vote was over ten percentage points. Only one union, the Bakers, had a 
similar rise. This was attributed to its campaign being held immediately after 
its annual conference where delegates had been rallied in support of the 
campaign and of going back to their workplace to urge a Yes vote. However, 
the overall outcome was that union members voted clearly for a continuation 
of political funds, perhaps an unlikely outcome in view of the controversy 
about relationships with the Labour government evident in the period leading 
up to the ballots. In order to explain this we need to review and analyse the 
campaign conducted by the unions and the co-ordinating body the Trade 
Union Co-ordinating Committee (TUCC).  
 
THE 2003-04 CAMPAIGN 
In the previous two campaigns a Trade Union Co-ordinating Committee was 
set up as a temporary organisation to co-ordinate the YES campaign 
(Leopold, 1986; 1997; Steele et al., 1986). This body was reconstituted by 
19 unions in June 2003 to ‘pool resources and ideas on how to get the 
greatest Yes vote on the highest turnout in the next round of ballots’ (TUCC, 
2004a:2). The campaign materials were launched at the September 2003 
TUC Congress in Brighton. Not all unions voting to retain a political fund were 
members of the TUCC, and due to subsequent union mergers, not all TUCC 
members actually re-balloted.  
 
The TUCC had four main objectives: to offer unions legal advice on political 
fund review ballots including advice on obtaining necessary approval of rules 
from the Certification Officer; to prepare campaign material for use by 
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member unions; to co-ordinate the timing of the campaign to best effect; to 
lobby for the removal of the legal requirement for decadel political fund 
review ballots. 
The first objective was largely technical as there was a maze of legal rules 
which unions had to follow closely in order to conduct a successful ballot. 
This included ensuring that the political fund rules referred to the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 rather than prior 
legislation, and that they were submitted timeously to the Certification 
Officer in order to receive the necessary approvals prior to any campaigning. 
To this end the TUCC prepared a flow chart of necessary steps and 
permissions and offered guidance and support to individual unions in order to 
put everything in place.  
In terms of the campaign and campaign materials, the key decision was how 
to play the question of the significance of political campaigning on issues of 
importance to union members, on the one hand, and, on the other, the links 
between trade unions and the Labour Party.  Under the terms of the 
legislation neither could be done without a political fund, but the latter did 
not necessarily follow from the former. In the years after the first round of 
balloting a number of trade unions had adopted political funds as an 
‘insurance policy’ to maintain their right to campaign politically. None of the 
unions which adopted a political fund in this period subsequently affiliated to 
Labour (Leopold, 1988). 
 
Opinion polling by the Campaign Company on behalf of the Trade Union and 
Labour Party Liaison Organisation (TULO), prior to the re-establishment of 
the TUCC, revealed that union members thought that having a political fund 
meant that it was all spent on the Labour Party (TUCC, 2004 www.vote-
yes.org.uk/research). This was seen as negative as the research revealed a 
fundamental antipathy to the Government. But when asked whether unions 
should be able to campaign on political purposes most respondents agreed, 
especially when the issues were linked to workplace concerns such as 
pensions, health and safety, and keeping a reasonable retirement age. These 
findings were similar to those from opinion polling done by MORI prior to the 
previous round (Leopold, 1997). The Campaign Company concluded that in 
order to be successful the campaign had to be ‘party political neutral’ to 
avoid discussion on affiliation to the Labour Party, the non-affiliated unions 
feeling isolated, and any anti Labour party/Labour Government vote (TUCC 
2004, www.vote-yes.org.uk/research:13). 
The TUCC concluded from this research that the campaign had to stress the 
need and the right of unions to campaign politically but clarify the issue of 
the links between unions and the Labour Party.  Part of this would be to 
separate the collective right to campaign and the individual right to opt out 
of paying into the political fund.  Rather than highlight general success in the 
past, union campaigners were urged to link current campaigns to the 
existence of the political fund. This underscored a finding from the research 
among members that ‘it is clear that the further a union’s political activity or 
campaign is removed from the workplace, the more fragile the support for 
political campaigning becomes’ (TUCC 2004, www.vote-
yes.org.uk/research:6). In order to distance the campaign from a likely 
general election in the spring of 2005, a number of unions held their review 
ballot ahead of a strict ten year cycle from their previous ballot. The ordering 
of ballots was timed to ensure a roll of success so that later unions could 
additionally use the argument that ‘since x unions have already successfully 
re-balloted, so must we, in order to preserve our right to campaign’.  
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In order to comply with the ten year balloting limit Amicus had successfully 
re-balloted before the TUCC was reformed.  The Amicus experience became 
a model for the TUCC. For example, the TUCC handbook highlighted the 
achievement of Amicus in successfully reballoting through linking its current 
pensions campaign to the political fund, arguing that without the fund it 
would mean that the union would be fighting ‘with one hand tied behind our 
back’ (Amicus campaign leaflet). A second key message from the Amicus 
experience was the need to have ‘workplace reps talking to members and 
generally word-of-mouth campaigning was the most effective way to get the 
message across’ (TUCC 2004, www.vote-yes.org.uk/campaign: 1).  
The general message was of the need to vote YES to defend rights already 
won and to enable unions to keep on campaigning for new rights for 
members. These were summarised in ‘5 reasons to vote YES: Better pay, 
terms and conditions; Improved health and safety; Better pensions; To 
continue fighting racism and discrimination; To secure union recognition.’ 
(TUCC 2003a:21). 
The overall campaign slogan was ‘Your Union Your Voice: use it don’t lose it’. 
This stressed the need for unions to be able to campaign through their 
collective strength but if individual members did not vote for a continuation 
of the political fund the collective and individual campaigning voice could be 
lost. Material prepared for use by union activists stressed that the ballots 
were ‘not about affiliation to the Labour Party…..but the overarching purpose 
of a Political Fund is to allow a union to campaign more widely on those 
political issues that matter to their members’ (TUCC, 2003a:32). Moreover, 
while campaign material listed laws won through union campaigning and 
political lobbying, future rights were, it was argued, even more linked to 
political campaigning as ‘the shift towards a ‘legal rights’ approach to 
industrial relations, not least through implementing European Union social 
directives, the need for unions to lobby and influence politicians in 
Westminster, Brussels and at local government level, is even more central to 
protecting union members at work than ever before’ (TUCC 2004, www.vote-
yes.org.uk/campaign: 1). The central thrust of this campaign was similar to 
the ‘Say Yes to a Voice’ theme of the 1990s campaign (Leopold, 1997).  
 
The TUCC therefore prepared a series of templates of campaign material - 
posters, leaflets, e-bulletins, web pages (www.vote-yes.org.uk) - setting out 
the central arguments and messages. Of particular concern was to have a 
simple clear message in multi-union workplaces so as to avoid confusion. 
However the central messages could be adapted to suit particular issues 
faced by member unions.  As the balloting method was required by law to be 
by post, a key visual image was a post box with the vote by date on it. But 
while the voting took place by post, the campaign was in the workplace.  
This post box logo was available with supporting visual images of workers for 
four broad sectors of employees - manufacturing, public sector, transport 
and the retired. Activists were provided with material to seek a Yes vote in 
their workplace and although written campaign materials were provided, the 
emphasis was on word of mouth campaigning- activists were encouraged to 
‘Talk to Ten’ other members in their workplace to persuade them to vote.  In 
addition, electronic means- emails, e-bulletins and text messages were 
encouraged to get the message over. 
 
The final message of the TUCC campaign is that decadel political fund ballots 
are an unnecessary financial, administrative and time-consuming burden on 
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trade unions. Their members have repeatedly voted overwhelmingly in 
favour of the right to campaign politically. Individual members are protected 
by the right to opt out of paying into the fund once it is established. The 
TUCC has therefore been lobbying to have the legislation repealed. They had 
been encouraged in such a view by the Government’s better regulation 
Taskforce which had found that the requirement on unions to ballot their 
members constituted an unnecessary burden. This was not, however, one of 
the ‘Warwick’ pledges, but individual Labour MPs have used such 
parliamentary devices as Early Day Motions to highlight union success and 
the unnecessary burden of the legislation. 
 
Many unions, on announcing their result, took the opportunity to combine 
proclaiming their success with calling for a repeal of the legislation. For 
example, the General Secretary of the Bakers’ Union declared: ‘our members 
have, once again, shown their support for the Union continuing its political 
activities on their behalf. We call upon the Government to immediately repeal 
this obnoxious and irrelevant legislation’ (www.bafu.org.news 12/07/2004). 
For those unions which had adopted a political fund as an ‘insurance policy’ 
to ensure that they were able to continue campaigning without falling foul of 
any legal challenge, and had no intention of using the fund to affiliate to any 
political party, the case against continuation of the legislation was even 
stronger. The general secretary of Prospect summed up such a view on 
announcing his union’s adoption of a political fund.  ‘The legislation should be 
repealed or drastically amended to ensure that unions like Prospect who are 
not and do not intend to be affiliated to any political party, can operate 
without fear of legal challenge or the need for a political fund’ (Noon, 
2003:2). 
 
Turnout 
The early opinion polling for TULO suggested that turnout was likely to be 
lower due to falling rates of political engagement generally and evidence of 
falling rates of turnout in union elections (TUCC 2004, www.vote-
yes.org.uk/research:3).  This was coupled with, in some unions, to supposed 
‘ballot fatigue’ due to a succession of ballots on mergers or elections.  There 
was a concern that very low levels of turnout could lead to unpredictable 
results. The conclusion drawn from this was that the campaign could not rely 
on appeals from general secretaries but had to rely on direct communication 
in the workplace from peers.  As can be seen in Table 3, the prediction of a 
lower turnout was borne out with a decline in the overall average from 38 to 
28%. Moreover, only three unions managed to increase their turnout 
compared with the ballot ten years earlier. A more valid comparison, 
however, might be with the average turnout in any union’s regular elections. 
During this period the average turnout in elections for general secretaries 
was 20%.  
Insert Table 3 here.  
The concern about low turnout was reflected in the campaign materials. The 
post box logo was used throughout the materials but one of its variants was 
a poster showing half a post box, half a dustbin, with the strap line ‘Post It, 
Don’t Bin It!’ This picked up on one of the key findings of the Campaign 
Company research that member lack of interest might mean that the ballot 
paper would go from the doormat to the mantelpiece, then to the bin, 
unopened. The campaign had to convince such members that the issue was 
important and that participating would mean something. 
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Vote NO Campaigns  
In the previous two rounds of political fund voting there was very limited 
evidence of organised campaigns to encourage members to vote NO from 
inside unions. In the first round some national newspapers and conservative 
politicians made weak attempts to encourage a NO vote but, as they were 
usually isolated from the internal union campaigns and the dates of the 
ballots, these calls from the outside made little impact (Leopold, 1986). In 
the 1994-96 round there was a campaign inside Unison for a NO vote but 
this was sidetracked by the intention of setting up two political funds within 
the union, an affiliated one and a non- affiliated one (Leopold, 1997).  
In the current round there was a greater concern that there might be 
organised NO votes. Just prior to the main round, an attempt to establish a 
political fund (without Labour Party affiliation) in the NUJ narrowly foundered 
by 53%-47%. Although the union executive, in proposing the fund, sought to 
dissociate it from party political activity, there was concern among the 
membership because of the nature of their work.  A NO campaign organised 
by prominent members in high-profile television jobs prevailed.  In the main 
round of balloting there was a concern that a NO vote could be a proxy for a 
number of currents of discontent, either with union performance or the 
policies of the Labour government, and be turned into a referendum on 
continued affiliation to the Labour Party. This was particularly so given that 
one union had disaffiliated, and one been expelled from the Labour Party, 
while others had publicly reduced their levels of funding. In the event none 
of these fears were realised and the two former affiliated unions, RMT (88%) 
and FBU (74%) had two of the highest YES votes and also two of the highest 
turnouts.  
 
Disappearing funds 
Between 1996 and 2003 the number of separate political funds declined as 
smaller unions merged into larger ones, but of course they then became part 
of the larger political fund. Some very small unions had difficulty in 
maintaining their funds and in 1996 the Retained Fire-fighters’ Union decided 
to close its fund at its annual conference, while the GULO, although part of 
the TUCC, decided to abandon its fund with only 200 members subscribing. 
Another very small union, the Scottish Carpet Workers, had voted to 
maintain its fund in 1996, but because they had not conducted the ballot in 
accordance with rules approved by the Certification Officer, the fund lapsed.  
Three unions voted against establishing a fund; CPSA in 1997 and, after the 
union merged with the PSTCU, the new union, PCS, also voted against in 
April 1999. UNIFI voted against a fund in 2000 but subsequently transferred 
into Amicus which has a fund. In 1997, the Society of Radiographers voted to 
establish a fund, but then did not implement this decision, while the Prison 
Officers’ Association were required by the Certification Officer to conduct 
their ballot again in 1997 as a complaint against the conduct of their 1996 
ballot was upheld.  
 
Individual Union Campaigns 
The general campaign strategy explained to union members what having a 
political fund meant in terms of the ability of unions to campaign on political 
issues of importance to members and of distancing the political fund from 
any direct link to the Labour Party, and hence to the Labour government. 
Material themed on these arguments was made available by the TUCC for its 
affiliates. The purpose of this section of the paper is to examine the extent to 
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which unions adopted the general campaign materials and to highlight any 
particular variations. Of particular concern here is how the two previously 
affiliated unions, RMT and FBU, campaigned. Although hard copy of 
campaign material was issued subsequently, all unions used the web as the 
main campaign vehicle and the analysis in this section is based on this 
electronic material. 
 
Unions used the TUCC campaign materials as the main thrust of the 
argument for a Yes vote, but added to them by making the campaigning 
issues directly relevant to its members citing recent or current union 
campaigns that could be affected if the union did not have a political fund.  
Specific examples are listed below: 
Amicus- Airbus, Nissan, Rover, and health and safety. 
ASLEF - Take Back the Track and Save Mail on Rail   
BECTU - BBC Charter review, Cuts in theatre and arts funding, 48 hour 
working time opt out, Regional ITV production. 
Connect - Communications Bill; for broadband access. 
CWU- Campaign against Post Office privatisation and the Broadband Britain 
campaign 
FBU- Save brigade controls, NO2 fire deaths campaign 
RMT- Pensions at sea, rail, tube and buses. 
TSSA - collective bargaining rights for manager grade staff  
USDAW-Freedom from Fear against violence and abuse, and against 
Christmas Day working  
TGWU- saving Rover, expanding airports, public services  
 
A couple of partial exceptions to this use of the central material was CATU 
which added nothing specific to its material and had one of the lowest Yes 
votes (67%) and turnouts (19%). This outcome was partly attributed to 
difficulties being experienced with the local Labour Party in Stoke on Trent, 
where most of CATU’s membership is located, and to the minimalist 
campaign the union ran. The GMB’s ‘Five reasons to vote YES’ were more 
general political campaigns rather  than specific GMB ones - Pensions, 
Working Time, Parental Rights, Minimum Wage, and Part Time Workers’ 
Rights. 
 
Although there was a TUCC Guide to Trade Union and Labour Party Links 
(TUCC, 2003c), union campaign material rarely mentioned the existence of, 
or the connections to, Labour MPs who were union members, or whose 
constituency party receives union financial support. This was particularly so 
in the main TUCC campaign. The separation of the vote to maintain a 
political fund from any decision about links to the Labour Party was 
encapsulated in the TGWU’s material:  ‘It is important that members 
understand that our Political Fund Ballot is not about affiliation to the Labour 
Party. It is about our ability to campaign effectively for members. Our 
Political Fund also enables us to keep members informed on political issues 
and to work with campaigning organisations such as Amnesty International’ 
(TGWU, 2004:3). 
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In the case of the FBU, which had disaffiliated from the Labour Party, the 
need to disconnect the vote from the Labour Party was even sharper: ‘It is 
important that members understand that this Political Fund Review Ballot is 
not about affiliation to any political party. We are not affiliated to any 
political party and the ballot does not seek to change that position’ (FBU, 
2004a). In reporting the ballot result the following sentiment was expressed: 
‘FBU members have been through a hard two and a half years in which the 
world of ‘politics’ has been found badly wanting’ (FBU, 2004b). The expelled 
RMT concentrated on the TUCC theme of the right to campaign politically and 
this contrasted with its 1994 material when it had been one of few unions 
that emphasised the links with the Labour Party as a reason to vote yes 
(Leopold, 1997).  
On the other hand, in a couple of cases, the relationship with the Labour 
Party was stated more positively. The CWU ‘seeks to influence policy and 
decisions on a range of industry, employment and other key issues mainly 
through its affiliation to the Labour Party.   The Union seeks to extend its 
engagement and input to Labour Party policy into every level of the Labour 
Party’ (CWU, 2004). After the vote it was stated in the TSSA result sheet 
that ‘without our political fund, we would never have been able to campaign 
for these laws (union recognition and family friendly working) - or the Labour 
Government that passed them’ (TSSA, 2004). 
 
Two of the three unions which voted before the TUCC was reformed, Connect 
and Amicus, did refer to links with MPs in their material. Connect highlighted 
the work of three Connect members who were Labour MPs, but also 
highlighted the work of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Telecoms to 
stress the union’s neutrality. This was similar to the campaign that the STE 
ran in 1993 (Leopold, 1997). The Amicus campaign literature included the 
MSF section highlighting its links with 80 MPs as well as members of the 
House of Lords, European and Scottish Parliaments, and Welsh Assembly. 
The main Amicus campaign material, however, did not play up these links 
but instead focussed on the general right to campaign politically and 
illustrated how this was valuable for specific Amicus campaigns, for example 
at Rover, as well as wider trade union campaigns such as for equal pay. 
 
Non TUCC Campaigns 
Three unions balloted before the TUCC was reformed. The Amicus campaign 
became a model for the TUCC approach. The other two unions largely 
operated on their own. Their strategy, however, was similar to that later 
adopted by the TUCC. The vote was about the union’s right and ability to 
campaign politically and not about political party affiliation. This view was 
summed up by the general secretary of Connect in announcing their large 
yes vote: ‘Connect is not affiliated to any political party, but we are a 
campaigning union. The political fund is essential for a union to influence on 
behalf of its members and I am proud of every Connect member who 
participated in this ballot. With this overwhelming result in favour, Connect 
members have demonstrated that they want a union that campaigns for 
them’ (www.gftu.org/news 19/02/03). In the build up to the vote Connect 
ran a series of articles in its monthly journal, Review, which highlighted the 
work done through its political fund including supporting a researcher to two 
Labour MPs who was also the secretary of the All Party Parliamentary group 
on Telecoms. The articles on this featured MPs from each of the main political 
parties who supported its work. Thus, Connect was able to highlight the 
value of political work directly in Westminster and Brussels, show its 
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relevance to union campaigns such as on the Communications Bill, but at the 
same time reassert political party neutrality.  
 
The case of Prospect is even more interesting. This was a vote to establish a 
political fund in a newly created union (although a component of the new 
union, the IPMS, had established a fund in 1988 and renewed it in 1998, the 
other element, the EMA, did not have one). The case was quite literally 
based on the ‘insurance policy’ argument, that, without a fund, union 
campaigns could be ruled unlawful just as the NALGO one had been in 1987. 
Thus members were reminded: ‘It’s still sound insurance to have a fund’ 
(Prospect, 2003). But the campaign material reminded members that the 
political fund’ would mean no change to Prospect’s long established policy of 
party political neutrality’. The final slogan ‘Let’s keep ourselves covered - and 
out of the courts’ was hardly the most inspiring or memorable slogan a union 
has campaigned under. This perhaps accounts for the narrowest of margins 
that the vote was won by;134; reflected in the headline announcing the 
result-‘Political fund squeaks home after recount’ (Prospect Profile, May 
2003:3). 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
Trade unions have again voted decisively to retain political funds, albeit on a 
lower turnout than in the previous two rounds. The campaign was conducted 
inside unions with virtually no discussion outside union circles. It was 
conducted in a changed political climate under a ‘New Labour’ government 
which had delivered mixed fortunes to unions and their members. The two 
years prior to the ballots had been particularly difficult in the continuation of 
‘the contentious alliance’ and at times there were strong advocates of ending 
that relationship, both within ‘New Labour’ and inside the union movement. 
Despite two unions ending their formal relationship, the consensus among 
the main unions was to try to re-establish it. However, these issues were not 
to the fore in the TUCC led campaign for a Yes vote. The emphasis was on 
unions’ right to campaign politically without fear of falling foul of the law. 
This view was common to both affiliated and non-affiliated unions and at the 
start of the campaign led to the establishment of a new political fund in 
Prospect. The TUCC and its supporters have used the clear result as a basis 
for arguing for the repeal of the law requiring the decadel review ballots but, 
as yet, that has not been promised by the Labour government.  
 
The basis of success in the ballots, of defending the right to campaign 
politically, rather than have links with the Labour Party may lead to a 
continuation of calls for the political fund to be spent in different ways. While 
unions again rallied round to support Labour in the 2001 general election and 
to provide organisers in key constituencies, unions are now more willingly 
spending their funds on wider political campaigns. This was clearly so for the 
disaffiliated FBU, which declared: ‘Following disaffiliation from the Labour 
Party, we have more money to spend on broad education programmes aimed 
at boosting the Union’s capacity to fight political campaigns in a rapidly 
changing environment. In short, we can now move ahead with revitalising 
the union’s political work to ensure it is even more responsive to the needs 
of members’ (FBU, 2004). But this was also true of unions which remain 
affiliated. For example, GMB withheld £2m to spend on an advertising 
campaign against privatisation, while BECTU now donates to Skillset, British 
Screen Advisory Council, and the Labour Research Department, and the CWU 
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in 2001 withheld from Labour £500,000, which the union spent instead on 
campaigning against government policy.  
 
In terms of Ludlam and Taylor’s models of the relationship between unions 
and the Labour Party this still leaves us caught between the union-party 
bonding model and the internal lobbying one. The unions have reaffirmed 
their right to campaign politically and are increasingly willing to do this on 
wider political campaigns, even ones against Labour government policy. But 
they have simultaneously retained a right to fund the party and are 
increasingly concerned to extract some benefits from that relationship. The 
Labour Party remains divided between those willing to accept a reassertion of 
the links with the trade unions as a means to obtain funds and resources, 
and those who would prefer to establish a new basis for political party 
funding, either through the state or individual donations. Such moves have 
not proved successful. There is no doubt that the relationship remains a 
‘contentious alliance’.  
 
Glossary of acronyms 
AFL  American Federation of Labor 
Amicus Formed by merger of AEEU, MSF, UNIFI,UTW and others 
ASLEF  Associated Society of Locomotive  
Engineers and Firemen 
BECTU Broadcasting Entertainment Cinematograph and Theatre Union  
BFAWU Bakers Food and Allied Workers Union 
CATU  Ceramics and Allied Trades Union 
Community Formed by merger of Iron and Steel and Knitwear Unions 
Connect Formed in 1999 from previous STE as the union for 
professionals in communications   
CPSA  Civil and Public Services Association  
CWU  Communication Workers Union 
EMA  Engineers and Mangers Association  
FBU  Fire Brigades Union 
GMB  General Municipal and Boilermakers Union 
GPMU Graphical Paper and Media Union, subsequently merged into 
Amicus  
GULO  General Union of Loom Overlookers 
IPMS  Institute of Professional and Managerial Staff  
MU  Musicians’ Union 
NALGO National and Local Government Officers’ Association 
NUJ  National Union of Journalists  
PCS  Public and Commercial Services Union 
Prospect Formed by merger of IPMS and EMA 
PSTCU  Public Services Tax and Commerce Union 
RMT  National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers 
STE  Society of Telecom Executives 
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TGWU  Transport and General Workers’ Union 
TSSA  Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association  
TUC  Trades Union Congress 
TUCC  Trades Union Coordinating Committee 
TULO  Trade Union and labour Party Liaison Organisation  
Unison  Formed by merger of COHSE, NALGO and NUPE 
UNIFI  Banking union, but merged into Amicus in 2004 
USDAW Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 
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Table 1 Results of Trade Unions Political Fund Ballots 2003-05 
 
Union Date Yes vote  No vote % Yes Turnout% 
Connect * Feb 2003 5764 1332 81 38 
Prospect * April 2003 21537 21403 51 41 
Amicus   * June 2003 161594 65012 72 27 
TGWU Mar 2004 102824 34065 75 19.5 
GPMU May 2004 13799 6758 67 23 
BFAWU July 2004 4862 220 96 18 
MU July 2004 5784 1991 74 25 
Community Sept 2004 6182 2060 75 23 
ASLEF Nov 2004 6519 1669 80 49 
TSSA Nov 2004 6453 1860 78 26 
RMT Nov 2004 21131 2840 88 37 
USDAW Nov 2004 45406 10350 81 18 
CWU Nov 2004 55999 21210 73 33 
CATU Nov 2004 1201 595 67 19 
BECTU Nov 2004 5520 1869 75 29 
FBU Nov 2004 14970 5328 74 42 
GMB Nov 2004 98423 12898 88 19 
Unison Mar 2005 243827 43194 85 20 
Total  - 821795 234654 78 28 
*= Not a member of the Trade Union Co-ordinating Committee 
Based on eligible members which for most unions were those in Great 
Britain, i.e. excluding members in Northern Ireland, Isle of Man and the 
Channel Islands.  
 
Unions in Italics are currently affiliated to the Labour Party 
 
Table 2 Differences in the Yes vote between 1994/6 and 2003/05  
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Table 3 Differences in the Turnout between 1994/6 and 2003/05  
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